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USURY IN ARKANSAS-REVISITED, REVISED AND
REAFFIRMED
James E' Mitchell* and W Christopher Barrier**
I. A CONTINUING REVIEW
Usury in Arkansas, published several years ago,' attempted to
do three things: (1) Explain the operation of Arkansas' constitu-
tional limitation on interest:2 Citing an "insatiable urge to catego-
rize," the author divided "all of Arkansas' usury law into fifteen
rules ' 3 some of which were stated unequivocally as being the law,
while others were "proposed", "perceived" or "disputed." (2)
Examine the economic impact of the usury law: The author found
risk capital scarce, consumer credit tight, and economic growth
stunted, findings based largely on interviews and an examination of
financial, rather than legal, publications.' (3) Propose an alternative
approach: The author suggested removing the limitation as to loans
to corporations and partnerships; establishing a public loan fund for
the poor at 10%; and allowing merchants to charge a higher price,
plus the interest, on credit sales. 5
The activity-judicial, legislative, and economic-since 1972
warrants a new look at the rules, the economy and the Arkansas
Constitution. Of the fifteen rules set forth in Usury in Arkansas,
only nine were stated as being the law, without qualification. All
nine of those rules have survived intact and are set forth in this
article with citations to new cases, if any, which confirm them. Rule
5, on Commitment Fees, was labeled a "proposed rule." The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has recently made its own proposal with some
precision in Arkansas Savings & Loan Association v. Mack Trucks
of Arkansas, Inc. 6 and Rule 5 must be revised in light of the court's
work. Rule 7, on Computational Devices, was acknowledged to be
"disputed" in part. Such devices have taken as many new forms as
they had old ones, and the Rule must be reconsidered. Rules 6, 9,
* B.A. Princeton University, 1964; J.D. Yale University, 1971. Principal, Jim Mitchell
and Jed Davis, P.A., Augusta, Maine.
** B.A. Hendrix College, 1964; L.L.B. Duke University, 1967. Partner, Spitzberg, Mitch-
ell & Gill, Little Rock.
1. Mitchell, Usury in Arkansas, 26 ARK. L. REv. 263 (1972), [hereinafter Usury in
Ark.].
2. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13.
3. Usury in Ark., supra note 1, at 265.
4. Id. at 298-321.
5. Id. at 264.
6. 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
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12, and 14 were said to have been "perceived." That weasel word
has proved fifty percent accurate. Rules 9 (Consolidations and Re-
workings) and 12 (Intent) must be reconsidered. Rules 6 (Compen-
sating Balances) and 14 (Single Interest and Insurance) have proved
resilient, though Rule 6 bears a new look.
Beyond these revisions, several entirely new areas have devel-
oped, requiring the review of questions not previously considered
central to usury law. The rules, old and new, affirmed or revised,
are set out in Section II of this article. Old rules which have been
modified and new rules are printed in italics.
Recent developments which have amplified or clarified the
original rules, including a number of procedural matters, are dis-
cussed in Section III of this article with new citations. Other devel-
opments which have necessitated changes in the original rules or
which have required new rules are also discussed in Section III.
Section IV is a discussion of recent decisions in areas which
were not covered by the original rules or which were not amenable
to the "urge to categorize." These areas include leasing, federal
legislation, federally-related loans, and federal constitutional ques-
tions.
The economic predictions of Usury in Arkansas have proved
painfully accurate in the intervening seven years. As predicted, risk
capital has become scarcer still, consumer credit has tightened, and
even home mortgage money has been hard to come by. Indeed, these
predictions have even been affirmed by the United States Congress.
Stephens Security Bank v. Eppivic Corp.,7 dealt with the validity
of the Brock Bill,' which allowed federally-insured banks and sav-
ings and loan associations to charge a rate related to the cost of
money in the federal reserve system on large business and agricul-
tural loans.' Under the Brock Bill the permissible rate hovered
around thirteen percent on such loans in Arkansas during the life
of the law, October 29, 1974, to July 1, 1977. The district court in
Stephens Security Bank noted that the measure was remedial and
was a conscious effort by Congress to deal with economic adversity.",
The 1979 Arkansas Constitutional Convention, whose handi-
work will be considered by the electorate on November 4, 1980, has
reviewed the constitutional limitation on interest. The fate of a new
7. 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (1976).
9. These lenders can negotiate their commercial paper through the system at less than
par, i.e. "discount" it, to gain liquidity.
10. Stephens Security Bank v. Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61, 65 (W.D. Ark. 1976).
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constitution may well depend on the Convention's ability to sepa-
rate a revised usury article from the main document or to draft an
acceptable cojmpromise article which gives both the relief which is
needed and some protection for which a need is perceived.
Section V of this article attempts to examine where we now
stand legally and to propose a revised usury article for consideration
by the Arkansas Constitutional Convention, when it reconvenes in
1980.
II. THE RULES-OLD AND NEW
Rule 1. CALCULATING ERRORS: MISTAKE
AND FRAUD - An honest error of calculation or
fraud on the part of an intermediary will not render
a note usurious as between borrower and lender even
though the rate called for by the document in ques-
tion be in excess of 10%.
Rule 2. CALLING LOANS - A lender may call or
accelerate a callable loan without fear that such ac-
tion will render usurious a previously non-usurious
loan. If the lender, upon accelerating payments due,
fails to calculate a rebate or otherwise account for
unearned interest, the borrower may refuse to pay
that excess amount only, but he may not refuse to
repay principal and earned interest.
Rule 3. COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS - In addi-
tion to signing a loan contract, a borrower and a
lender may enter into other contracts which result in
extra payments to the lender if the lender provides
adequate independent consideration for the extra
compensation.
Rule 4. COMMERCIAL PAPER: DISCOUNTING
AND RECOURSE - (Seller): As a seller of commer-
cial paper
1. You may sell the paper for any price without fear
of a usury charge so long as the transaction is a bona
fide sale of commercial paper. The sale may be with
or without recourse. You may not agree with a
finance company in advance that the company will
buy your paper at, say, 90% of face value and then
set your credit price and sell your merchandise for
credit at 10% simple. The court views this as one
transaction in which the real loan from the finance
company to the credit buyer bears usurious interest
1979]
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of roughly 20% and in which the sale price is set in
contemplation of the promised discount, thereby
implicating the seller in the usury. Neither the seller
in a recourse arrangement nor the lender in a non-
recourse arrangement can collect the debt or repos-
sess the merchandise.
(Buyer): As a buyer of commercial paper
1. You may buy paper at a discount from a retail
seller who can prove that he has only one price at
which he sells his merchandise whether you buy his
paper or not.
2. You may buy a usurious contract from a seller,
but you will find you have bought a nullity since
usurious paper is void upon being written. If you
knowingly purchase such a usurious and therefore
void contract, you may not recover your purchase
price since the instrument cannot be sued upon in
court nor otherwise enforced by you or the merchan-
dise seller against the merchandise buyer who is the
actual recipient of the benefit of your cash advance.
Rule 5. COMMITMENT FEES - (Proposed) - A
lender may require a potential borrower to buy the
lender's commitment to lend money if the proposed
loan transaction is sufficiently far off in time or is
contingent upon the borrower's completion of interim
matters. The lender requiring this fee may then still
lend money at 10% or get someone else to lend it at
10% without fear of a usury charge.
Rule 5. COMMITMENT FEES - (Perceived Rule)
- The Court will consider a fee for the reservation of
funds to be part of the interest charged on the funds
so reserved.
Rule 6. COMPENSATING BALANCES - (Per-
ceived Rule) - A bank may refuse to lend to noncusto-
mers when conditions require such a restriction, but
it may not legally require a borrower to open a check-
ing or savings account nor to buy a certificate of de-
posit as an express identifiable condition of getting a
specific loan when the interest on the loan plus the
value of the use of the deposited funds gives the bank
an overall return on its loan in excess of 10%.
Rule 7. COMPUTATIONAL DEVICES: DIS-
COUNTING, POINTS, ALLOCATING PAY-
MENTS - A lender may withhold or discount the
[Vol. 2:323
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maximum legal interest on a note for a period of
twelve months. That is, on a $100.00 note, at 10%, for
one year, a lender may legally refuse to forward more
than $90.00 even though that procedure raises the
technical interest rate to 11.11%.
1. Disputed sub-rule: A lender may withhold the
maximum legal interest or a portion thereof on a note
for a period of thirty-six months or more.
2. Sub-rule: Lenders may apply payments received
first to interest to the maximum amount of 10% per
annum on the unpaid balance as of the time of re-
ceipt of payment and then to principal.
3. Sub-rule: A lender may not devise any other
collection technique or computational device which
will increase his actual return above 10% per annum
simple.
Rule 8. CONFLICT OF LAWS - The law of the
state in which the contract is made will usually goV-
ern unless the parties agree that the law of some other
place should govern and they have a reasonable and
bona fide basis for making the agreement. When the
place of contract is in question, the court will count
contacts between the parties, the contract, and com-
peting jurisdictions. Place of payment of the loan
does not determine the issue.
Rule 9. CONSOLIDATING LOANS AND RE-
MAKING CONTRACTS - (Perceived Rule) - A fi-
nance company that refinances and consolidates its
own old notes for a borrower must give the borrower
full rebate credit for unearned interest and unused
insurance premium payments or else run the risk of
losing the entire principal amount of the new loan
because the unrebated sums become part of the inter-
est charges on the new loan. This rule applies to any
loan called prematurely and to any circumstance
which forces the borrower involuntarily to pay the
loan company more than 10%. Interest would be on
the actual authorized principal outstanding as op-
posed to some hypothetical or manipulated principal
amount.
Sub-rule: A borrower and lender may agree to cancel
a usurious contract and replace it with a legal one.
When the borrower makes the new contract voluntar-
1979]
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ily it is binding.
Sub-rule: If a contract is not usurious to begin with,
a usurious extension agreement will not void the orig-
inal contract, but only the extension thereof.
Rule 10. CONTINGENCIES AND PARTICIPA-
TIONS - Lenders may participate in profits in addi-
tion to receiving interest on loans only if the profits
depend on a contingency which involves a legitimate
commensurate risk of capital and is within reasona-
ble control of the debtor. Any other arrangement to
participate in profits may be usurious even though
the excess profit never materializes.
Rule 11. CONTINUOUS ACCOUNTS AND PEN-
ALTIES - When a seller and buyer enter into a long-
term contract for services, buyer to pay for services
periodically as consumed, the seller may charge a
penalty for any and all overdue payments, which
charge may exceed 10% annual interest on the out-
standing balance of payments due.
Rule 12. CONTRACT LIMITATIONS AND IN-
TENT - (Perceived Rule) - Except in cases of clear
violation on the face of a contract or of mistaken
ideas about the law or legal limit, intent to extract a
usurious interest charge is a primary element of the
offense of usury. A recitation in the contract itself of
intent to charge no more than a legally computed
10% rate will negate less probative evidence of evil or
unlawful intent.
Rule 12 - CONTRACT LIMITATIONS AND IN-
TENT - (New Perceived Rule) - While the intent of
the lender, when ascertainable, is one element to be
considered in determining whether a contract is usu-
rious, good faith efforts to comply with the law will
not excuse carelessness or mistake resulting in a usu-
rious rate being charged or collected. Although a dis-
claimer of illegal intent will be considered, state-
ments of intent are less important than actual re-
sults. Intent. to collect more than 10% interest alone
may be sufficient evidence to find a lender guilty of
usury, even without any agreement by the borrower
to pay it, especially if there is a strong likelihood that
the excess, in the ordinary course of events, would
have in fact been collected.
[Vol. 2:323
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New Perceived Sub-rule: "Intent to collect" may be
established by previously established or used proce-
dures; or computer programs in existence at the time
of the loan; or bills sent, calling for the excessive
interest.
Rule 13. COST OF BUSINESS AND EXCESS
CHARGES - A lender may charge a borrower, in ad-
dition to 10% interest, for all services or fees which
benefit the borrower and do not fall within normal
business expenses of lenders even if such charges also
partially benefit lender. Any charge to the borrower
for services which benefit only the lender or parallel
his normal business expenses constitutes interest and
must be added to the recited contract interest to de-
termine the actual effective interest rate on the ques-
tioned loan. Payment by the lender of a collected fee
to a third party will partially negate any inference
that the fee is of benefit to the lender.
Sub-rule: If the lender fails to specify what excess
charges are for, the court will assume they are inter-
est charges unless the lender can prove otherwise.
Rule 14. CREDIT INSURANCE - (Perceived Rule)
- Lenders may require that a borrower insure his loan
or his credit purchase. As agents for third party insur-
ance companies, they may sell insurance. They may
buy it for the borrower. But they may not require that
he buy insurance through them, nor may they partic-
ipate in kickbacks, as distinguished from bona fide
agent's fees from insurors which add to their lending
profits. If lenders collect premiums for credit or
credit-related property insurance out of the money
they lend to borrowers, they must pay these prem-
iums to third parties and insure that the borrower
actually benefits or is given the opportunity to bene-
fit from the insurance coverage for which they with-
held the premium. Collecting the premium with pro-
fessed intent to pay it out at some future time will not
satisfy the court that the collector is not using the
collection and supposed intent to pay it out as a cloak
for usury.
Rule 15. CREDIT PRICE: THE TIME-PRICE
DIFFERENTIAL - A seller may sell any item for
credit at a credit price which is higher than the cash
1979]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
price so long as he does not set the credit price on a
cash price estimate and use the difference in fact to
add to his interest charges.
Added Rule 16. DISBURSEMENT - A lender may
charge interest from the day of closing at a full 10%
even if funds are actually disbursed after the day of
closing, provided the discrepancy involves no bad
faith and relates to legitimate commercial problems
of borrower and lender.
Added Rule 17. UNCERTAIN RATES - A non-
usurious contract which calls for an uncertain or vari-
able rate of interest, or which calls for specified appli-
cations of funds going to the lender under specified
circumstances, may become usurious as a result of
occurrences taking place after the contract is exe-
cuted, even if those circumstances were not within
the contemplation of either party to the contract.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RULE 1 (CALCULATING ERRORS: MISTAKE AND
FRAUD)
While Rule 1 has not changed, the use of fraud as a counter to
the defense of usury gained some strength with the decision in
Turney v. Roberts." In Turney, the borrower defrauded the lender
in a host of ways. The borrower over-valued collateral, misrepre-
sented the actions of third parties, and assured the lender that the
loan arrangement was legal when in fact the borrower had not
checked with a lawyer about the loan's legality. The loan documents
as signed, taking all the circumstances of the transaction into ac-
count, called for an interest rate substantially in excess of ten per-
cent. The lender knew he would get more than ten percent but had
been tricked into believing this to be legal. The chancellor had
reluctantly voided the contract for usury while censuring the bor-
rower." The Arkansas Supreme Court merely reformed the contract
and noted, "We perceive no valid rationale why a usurious contract
is immune to reformation. Our usury law is not so ironclad nor
designed to provide an impenetrable shield so as to prevent abso-
lutely an action for reformation of a written instrument.' 3 In
11. 255 Ark. 503, 501 S.W.2d 601 (1973).
12. Id. at 508, 501 S.W.2d at 605.
13. Id. at 509, 501 S.W.2d at 606.
330 [Vol. 2:323
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Turney the court must have viewed the borrower's palpable fraud
as worse than the lender's usury. Since the lender clearly intended
to receive more than ten percent, any other reading would make
Turney inconsistent with such cases as First National Bank of
Memphis v. Thompson'4 and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Catalani. 15
Because Turney involved a naive individual lender, it may not
help professonal lenders. It is highly unlikely that a commercial
lender will manufacture a case in which it allows itself to be de-
frauded to test this rule, but if such circumstances arise, the Turney
reasoning should be exploited.
While fraud has gained new strength as a counter to the defense
of usury, recent cases have further eroded the use of honest mistakes
as a shield against usury defenses. Lenders blamed "computer
error" for overcharges in three cases, Redbarn Chemicals, Inc. v.
Bradshaw;", Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co.;" and Southland Mobile
Home Corp. v. Webster. ' 8 Each case was decided against the lender.
In Redbarn there was evidence contradicting the claim that the
computer had been programmed incorrectly. Nevertheless, in all
three cases the result seemed to be based at least in part on the
assumption that anyone sophisticated enough to use a computer
had better be sophisticated enough to program it correctly. It may
be almost a rule of law that a computer cannot make a good faith
mistake in calculating interest."
RULE 3 (COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS)
Rule 3 was recently reaffirmed in Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust
Co., N.A., 1 wherein the Arkansas Supreme Court found the annual
membership fees charged by banks on bank cards to be fees for "a
convenience" and not interest," "although their effect may be to
14. 249 Ark. 972, 463 S.W.2d 87 (1971). In Thompson the court found no evidence of
fraud or mistake and no evidence of excusable error in calculation. The defense of usury was
upheld on the basis that any mistake by the lender lay in its belief that the charge was lawful,
which amounted to a mistake of law from which the lender could not be relieved. Id. at 977,
463 S.W.2d at 89.
15. 238 Ark. 561, 383 S.W.2d 99 (1964). In Catalani the contract was held usurious as a
mistake of law when the lender thought his method of charging interest was lawful. Id. at
564, 383 S.W.2d at 101.
16. 254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973).
17. 261 Ark. 437, 549 S.W.2d 474 (1977).
18. 263 Ark. 100, 563 S.W.2d 430 (1978).
19. See also the discussion under Rule 12, p. 328 infra.
20. 260 Ark. 725, 543 S.W.2d 496 (1976).
21. Id. at 730, 543 S.W.2d at 498.
19791
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increase the sum payable from the borrower to the lender. '22 The
court in Key cited Leavitt v. Marathon Oil Co. 2 in which the bor-
rower was also required to lease certain property from the lender as
a condition to obtaining the loan. 2' Key, however, may serve to
clarify Rule 3 and qualify Leavitt. The court noted, "Mrs. Key was
not a necessitous borrower who as a prerequisite to a loan was forced
to buy something which she did not want. 2 5 The cost of the collat-
eral agreement must relate to its actual value to the borrower, not
simply in absolute terms.
RULE 5 (COMMITMENT FEES) and RULE 7
(COMPUTATIONAL DEVICES: DISCOUNTING, POINTS,
ALLOCATING PAYMENTS)
Rule 5 was only a "proposed rule," there being no fixed law on
the subject at the time of the prior article. Arkansas Savings & Loan
Association v. Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc .2 1 does not change the
proposal offered in Rule 5 nor the substance of Rule 7, but the rules
must be narrowed somewhat in view of that case.
In Mack Trucks, over the filed protests of the major portion of
Arkansas' financial community, the court found a "service charge"
or "commitment fee" to be interest, without distinguishing the two
terms. The lender collected a one percent fee on a construction loan
in addition to interest at nine percent. Because the one percent was
collected in advance on the full amount, while disbursements were
made periodically, the overall return exceeded ten percent. We
question whether Mack Trucks is really a "service charge" case. A
"service charge" is ordinarily a flat periodic fee for extending credit,
such as a "carrying charge" on a charge account, or the
"membership fees" on credit card plans, as in Key v. Worthen Bank
& Trust Co., N.A.Y (which appears to us to be a genuine "service
charge" case). Because the "commitment fee" in Mack Trucks was
charged not in advance of closing to reserve funds entirely at a
future time, but rather at closing, the case may not be a true
"commitment fee" case either.
To contrast a nominal commitment fee with a genuine commit-
22. Id. at 730, 543 S.W.2d at 499.
23. 186 Ark. 1077, 57 S.W.2d 814 (1933).
24. Id. at 1079-80, 57 S.W.2d at 815.
25. Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 Ark. 725, 730, 543 S.W.2d 496, 498
(1976).
26. 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
27. 260 Ark. 725, 543 S.W.2d 496 (1976).
[Vol. 2:323
1979] USURY IN ARKANSAS
ment fee, it may be useful to compare Mack Trucks and Paley v.
Barton Savings & Loan Association. 2 In Paley a New Jersey court
noted that there was "no loan of money" at the time of the payment
of the fee,29 and reasoned that if there is no loan, there is no interest,
and the fee must necessarily be something else. In Mack Trucks,
even though all of the money was not disbursed at closing, there was
a note and other attendant loan documents-a "loan of money."
The Arkansas Supreme Court's language in Mack Trucks does not
recognize the Paley distinction and is otherwise so broad that Pro-
posed Rule 5 has been changed to a Perceived Rule and rewritten.
This rule, as rewritten, is consistent with the "admission" in
Sosebee v. Boswell,30 over which the proposed rule had glossed. In
Sosebee, a one percent "commitment fee" and a one percent
"service charge" were "admittedly . . .chargeable as interest,"' 3' an
"admission" certainly not made in Mack Trucks. That this per-
ceived rule may defy economic reality is immaterial. 31
The Arkansas Supreme Court also considered whether the fee
in Mack Trucks was a permissible discount, as discussed in Rule 7
(Computational Devices: Discounting, Points, Allocating Pay-
28. 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (1964).
29. Id. at 81, 196 A.2d at 685.
30. 242 Ark. 396, 414 S.W.2d 380, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967).
31. Id. at 398, 414 S.W.2d at 381.
32. A true commitment fee serves a true purpose. It pins the availability of a given
amount of money at a certain rate. It is a speculative purchase of a promise. If the rates go
up, the fee was well spent. If the rates go-down, it was wasted.
A true commitment fee is analogous to a call option. To say that the fee is nothing more
than extra interest to the bound lender is as logically inaccurate as to say that the price of a
call option is nothing more than extra dividends to the seller of the option. The commitment
fee is extra income to the lender just as call option proceeds are extra income to the holder
of the optioned shares, but all income is not interest to a lender any more than all income is
dividends to a holder of stock.
A true commitment fee is paid before money is loaned. There may never be a loan of
money. If the money were never loaned, what would the rate of interest be if the fee is
interest?
In Mack Trucks the fee was not a true commitment fee, even though the court said it
was. (Although the decision itself is unanimous, in his concurring opinion on rehearing, Mr.
Chief Justice Harris seems to be suggesting that the court withhold judgment on "true"
commitment fees.) The case, however, must be read as though all commitment fees were
tainted, and the financial community remains, to that degree, further hamstrung by the
usury law, which has wreaked enough havoc without this.
As a possible way out, we propose a test case. Set up a true commitment fee, paid in
advance of the loan, exclusively to pin the price and availability of money. Set it up in parallel
with two borrowers. One will decide to borrow the money and one will decide not to borrow.
Have the rate in both cases be 10% on the money to be borrowed. Have both sue for a
declaratory judgment voiding the deal on the basis of usury. If the court affirms the Mack
Trucks language, no one will be any worse off than now. Forced by circumstances to deal with
economic reality, the court may reinterpret Mack Trucks. It is worth a try.
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ments). The answer was no. The court characterized the fee as "no
more than a discount" 3 and found it to be interest. But we would
also question whether Mack Trucks is a true "discount" case, in the
sense that that term is ordinarily used in mortgage lending. Specifi-
cally, a mortgage banker may agree to make a loan, after receiving
a commitment from a permanent lender (probably a quasi-
governmental entity, such as the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation), at a specific rate-perhaps nine percent. The mortgage
banker closes the loan and immediately assigns it to, in this exam-
ple, FNMA, which funds it. But how does the mortgage banker
make any money? On such loans, the mortgage banker charges a
"discount" or "points," the maximum amount of which is ordinarily
set by the federal government. (The borrower may also end up pay-
ing a "commitment fee" and a "service fee" as well, which do not
need to be considered for purposes of this illustration.) In today's
money market, the numerical value of the discount, when added to
the nominal percentage rate, is almost invariably in excess of ten
percent, bringing such loans within the prohibition of the third sub-
rule under original Rule 7 which disapproves collection techniques
which increase the lender's actual return above ten percent per
annum and echoes the "admission" in Sosebee v. Boswell. 3
Questions of federal pre-emption aside, more recently lawyers
for lenders have disregarded Sosebee and have privately rational-
ized this apparent transgression in one of two ways. The first argu-
ment would spread the dollar amount of the discount over the life
of the loan, adding it to the actual interest. This seems irtificial
and, in the lightof the court's skepticism in Mack Trucks, wholly
unsupportable 5
The second argument is more sophisticated. It would deduct
the discount from the face amount of the loan and ignore the stated
interest rate. The effective interest rate is then calculated by looking
at this new face amount and the monthly payments. The results can
be somewhat startling. Computed actuarily, a twenty-five year loan
with a stated interest rate of nine and three-quarters percent per
annum will support a discount of almost two "points"-a numerical
33. Ark. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 268, 566 S.W.2d
128, 131 (1978). By commenting gratuitously on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-604 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(as amended 1961) which permits discounting in advance for 36 months, the court added
further dispute to the "disputed sub-rule" set out under Rule 7 in the original article, which
recognized this 36-month statutory exception.
34. 242 Ark. 396, 398, 414 S.W.2d 380, 381 (1967).
35. In this regard, see also Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Kramer, 263 Ark. 169, 563
S.W.2d 451 (1978), discussed p. 347 infra with respect to added Rule 17.
334 [Vol. 2:323
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total of nearly eleven and three-quarters percent. However, a thirty
year loan with a stated interest rate of nine percent per annum will
support a discount of over eight points-a numerical total of over
seventeen percent! 3
Despite the size of these numbers, the borrower still pays ten
percent or less on the money he actually gets, if one looks at the
substance of the transaction, as the law says we should.37 Addition-
ally, the device provides a means for compensating mortgage bank-
ers for originating loans and, hence, stimulates production of hous-
ing. Finally, the size of the discount fluctuates with the money
market, varying the amount of cash borrowers must produce on the
front end-something which also occurs with conventional loans as
to down payments.
The underlying policy of the Arkansas Supreme Court's deci-
sions as well as economic realities would dictate to us the accept-
ance both of true commitment fees and of an actuarial approach to
discounts. Nevertheless, the language of Mack Trucks-although
written in very broad terms by a special justice-falls clearly within
the trend of the majority's thinking and must be taken at face value
in condemning both commitment fees and discounts.
RULE 6 (COMPENSATING BALANCES)
The Arkansas court has yet to consider this perceived rule. In
McAdoo v. Union National Bank, 3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals faced the issue noting the lack of Arkansas Supreme Court
precedent. In McAdoo the lender clearly required the borrower to
purchase a $300,000 certificate of deposit from a broker and place
it in the lending bank in order to secure a $500,000 loan. The jury
found no usury. The court of appeals stated:
36. The following figures were provided by a consulting actuary. The first column is the
duration of the loan. The headings on the next four columns indicate the stated interest rate.
The figures below each of these rates indicate the maximum discounts (as a percent) which
may be applied to loans at those stated rates, for those durations, to produce an effective
interest rate of slightly less than ten percent per annum:
Years 9 %r 9.25 (I 9.50% 9.75%
20 6.76624 % 5.093641% 3.40826% 1.71030%
25 7.64873 % 5.75752% 3.85207% 1.93276%
30 8.31259% 6.25546% 4.18397% 2.09865%
37. Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark. 164, 458 S.W.2d 403 (1970).
38. 535 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1976).
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[W]e think that the requirement with which we are concerned is
suspect, and we do not give carte blanche legal approval to the
requirement or to others comparable to it. On the other hand, we
are not prepared to say that such a requirement automatically or
as a matter of Arkansas law makes the affected obligation usurious
simply because the lender may derive more money from the overall
transaction than he would have received had he made the loan at
the maximum legal rate of interest with no strings attached.3 ,
Thus, the law of the Eighth Circuit clearly is that the law of Arkan-
sas on this issue is unclear.
Despite McAdoo, any careful lawyer will still rely on Perceived
Rule 6 when advising a lender. Compensating balances are danger-
ous until proven otherwise. It is one thing to prefer customers who
already have substantial balances, still another to dictate the de-
posit of specific minimums as a precondition of a loan. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court's reasoning in Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust
Co., N.A. 40 may have some bearing here. A pre-existing account
would presumably meet some need of the borrower. A new account,
however, may be positively undesirable-if, for example, a high
checking account balance were required, causing a complete loss of
interest, or a deposit in a savings account bearing interest at a rate
lower than would otherwise be available to the borrower was re-
quired.
In McAdoo the court of appeals noted specifically that the loan
was fully disbursed before the certificate of deposit was purchased.4'
Time of disbursement may be critical in compensating-balances
cases if the Arkansas Supreme Court follows the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in McAdoo. If the law flows in another direction, we can
only say that the significance of time of disbursement is as yet
unknown.4
RULE 9 (CONSOLIDATING LOANS AND REMAKING
CONTRACTS)
A new sub-rule, helpful to lenders in some instances, has been
added to Rule 9 (Consolidating Loans and Remaking Contracts). In
39. Id. at 1057.
40. 260 Ark. 725, 543 S.W.2d 496 (1976).
41. McAdoo v. Union Nat'l Bank, 535 F.2d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1976).
42. In this regard, consider the discussion with reference to Added Rule 16 (Disburse-
ment). Even if compensating balances may be required, the McAdoo decision does not con-
done mere failure to disburse as a means of maintaining them. In that way, it follows the
spirit of the Arkansas decisions.
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Hayes V. First National Bank,4" the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that when payment of the unpaid balance of a nonusurious loan is
extended at a usurious rate, only the extension is usurious." How-
ever, this sub-rule may be of significance to national banks only. If
a borrower pays a usurious loan, he may only recoup the excessive
interest." But, if the lender is a national bank, under federal law,
it may have to refund twice the amount of the interest already
paid." (This sub-rule is dictum in Hayes, but is apparently well-
considered.)
RULE 10 (CONTINGENCIES AND PARTICIPATIONS)
Rule 10 still apples to contingent profits. Added Rule 17 (Un-
certain Rates) is required to consider contingent interest rates.4,
RULE 11 (CONTINUOUS ACCOUNTS AND PENALTIES)
Hayes v. First National Bank"8 also extends the doctrine of Rule
11 (Continuous Accounts and Penalties) beyond utility cases. Hayes
supports a broad application of the rule that true penalty charges
are not interest. 49
RULE 12 (CONTRACT LIMITATIONS AND INTENT)
The law with reference to intent, as enunciated in Rule 12,
seemed relatively clear when the rule was written. In Southland
Mobile Home Corp. v. Webster,0 however, Justice Smith adopted
virtually Chinese inscrutability to effect a subtle change in Arkan-
sas' substantive law of usury:
We have often said, in upholding contracts assailed as usurious,
that for a charge to constitute usury the lender must have intended
to take more than the maximum rate of interest. Brown v. Central
Ark. Production Credit Ass'n . . . . That statement, needless to
say, cannot be taken literally in every situation. A lender can no
more purge a loan of usury by saying that he did not intend to
charge more than 10% interest than a borrower can contaminate
his debt by saying that he meant to pay more than 10%. Our
43. 256 Ark. 328, 507 S.W.2d 701 (1974).
44. Id. at 332, 507 S.W.2d at 703-04.
45. Harris v. McCann, 229 Ark. 972, 319 S.W.2d 832 (1959).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 86 (1976).
47. See discussion of Rule 17 p. 347-49, infra.
48. 256 Ark. 328, 507 S.W.2d 701 (1974).
49. Id. at 331, 507 S.W.2d at 703.
50. 263 Ark. 100, 563 S.W.2d 430 (1978).
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decisions have never implied that usury does not exist unless the
parties, upon concluding their agreement, have shaken hands and
congratulated each other upon having arrived at a contract calling
for only 12% interest.5
The last sentence we must take as dictum. The case at bar involved
a computer mistake overcharging a total of between five and
twenty-five dollars over a six year period on a loan in excess of
$5,000.00 made by a mobile home dealer. The dealer had actually
submitted computer print-outs to a law firm in advance to be cer-
tain the calculated interest rates were legal.5 2
The court will undoubtedly continue to say, on occasion, that
the intent required is the intent to charge a certain amount and that
if that amount happened to exceed ten percent, there was an intent
to charge a usurious rate of interest. But that gets us nowhere,
especially when dealing with computers. The reality may be, as in
Webster or Cagle, that the lender knows little about the operation
of computers or has a party some distance removed from the trans-
action do the calculations or the billing, or both. When we were
dealing with manual pre-calculated interest tables53 (which tables,
by the way, themselves disagree with each other) the court excused
obvious good faith errors. No more.
In Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co.," the contract documents called
for a ten percent rate of interest. This should have been far stronger
evidence of a lack of intent to charge a usurious rate than any sort
of disclaimer clause saying that no more than the legal rate would
be charged. The Cagle lender, using a contract valid on its face,
availed itself of a modestly generous interest rate calculated by a
computer located and programmed in its Memphis, Tennessee,
office. Billing on a daily interest calculation, based on a 360 day
year, resulted in a rate slightly in excess of ten percent per annum.
Interest was also compounded. The true annual interest came to
10.6235296 percent, as billed. The Arkansas Supreme Court appar-
ently did not believe the assertion that the calculations were simply
mistakes.
But Cagle does more than indicate the court's disbelief in the
assertion of mistake, because when the lender discovered its error
(concurrently with the beginning of litigation), it dropped the excess
51. Id. at 105, 563 S.W.2d at 432.
52. Id. at 104, 563 S.W.2d at 432.
53. Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 499 S.W.2d 68 (1973);
Sammons-Pennington Co. v. Norton, 241 Ark. 341, 408 S.W.2d 487 (1966).
54. 261 Ark. 437, 549 S.W.2d 474 (1977).
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charge. The charge furthermore, would not have been permissible
under the contract signed. There was clearly no "contract" to take
usurious interest as required by the Constitution,"5 no "agreement"
as required by prior cases,5" and no such interest was "reserved,
taken or secured. ' 51 No such interest was reserved, taken or secured
in Cagle, because no payment was made.58 There was nothing which
would previously, under case, constitutional or statutory law, have
constituted usury except the intent, inferred from billing state-
ments, to collect a certain amount of money, in excess of either the
legal or the contract rate.
It would appear, therefore, from Cagle that the intent to collect
alone-without contractual consent or consummation-may consti-
tute usury. The case also seems to say that the intent to avoid usury
is insufficient, if one in fact has collected a payment. Based upon
the facts in Cagle the following elements should render a loan usu-
rious: 1) a note not usurious on its face, but 2) a computer which
uses a 360 day year, 3) and compounds interest at intervals of less
than a year, with 4) the actual interest billed-for exceeding ten
percent per annum, even though no payment is collected. But will
such a fact situation always result in a usurious loan?
In First American National Bank of Nashville, Tennessee v.
McClure Construction Co.,56 a Nashville bank bought three mort-
gage loans on Arkansas real estate from its Memphis subsidiary
under circumstances similar to those above. The Arkansas Supreme
Court conceded that these facts made the case "similar" to Cagle. 10
The chancellor had found usury, but the Arkansas Supreme Court
disagreed and proceeded to note certain dissimilarities.
In Cagle, the lender had an Arkansas office and did business
regularly in Arkansas, while First American of Nashville and its
assignor neither had offices in Arkansas nor regularly transacted
business in the state."' The point of making this distinction, how-
ever, is certainly unclear, as the court was not deciding a conflict of
law question, as contemplated by Rule 8.
The Cagle computer used a 360 day year for all loans; the Ar-
kansas manager brushed off complaints of excessive interest; and
"[miost significantly," the Cagle lender had actually collected ex-
55. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13.
56. See, e.g., Briggs v. Steele, 91 Ark. 458, 461-62, 121 S.W. 754, 755 (1909).
57. Id. at 462, 121 S.W. at 755.
58. Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co., 261 Ark. 437, 439, 549 S.W.2d 474, 475 (1977).
59. 265 Ark. 792, 581 S.W.2d 550 (1979).
60. Id. at 794-95, 581 S.W.2d at 551.
61. Id. at 795, 581 S.W.2d at 551.
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cessive interest in a companion transaction."2 There is nothing in the
McClure opinion, however, to indicate that the Nashville bank
would not have collected the excess interest, had the loans been paid
according to their terms, instead of being foreclosed. What if, for
instance, one were paid, and then the other two were foreclosed?
Would this occurrence provide a usury defense to the foreclosures?
There was no evidence in McClure, according to the court, that
the computer was programmed to compute all loans on a 360 day
year, but one would assume from Cagle that the burden of proof in
this regard would be on the lender to prove affirmatively that it did
have an appropriate program that was not used. The McClure opin-
ion does not even mention the compounding problem.
What it does mention is intent, and a "distinction, . . . some-
times a fine one, between a mistake of fact and one of law.""3 As for
intent, the chancellor did not "make a specific finding of intent to
make an unlawful charge," but simply found Cagle controlling. 4
This apparently was not enough. By way of making this distinction
the court cited Brooks v. Burgess 5 and Ford Motor Company v.
Catalani.6 If these cites mean anything, the formulation has to be
something like this: If you know how interest is going to be calcu-
lated, but think the method is acceptable, you had better be right.
If you don't know how it is going to be 6alculated, but hope it is done
within the law, you may be safe.
The bank in McClure, however, did not send off for an interest
table. It used its own computer. The only distinction would seem
to be that in McClure the officer supposedly knew he couldn't use
a 360 day year and one was used anyway, while in Cagle the com-
puter would calculate every loan that way, regardless of the officer's
intent.
In the final analysis, we must profess some affinity for Justice
Purtle's opinion in McClure, which concurs in the result but not the
method: "I cannot distinguish the facts in the present case from
those in Cagle . . . .As it stands, the lawyers and the courts will
just have to guess at which case we may decide to follow. 6 17 Cagle
made the new rule on intent somewhat fuzzier than the old one.
McClure now makes the rule almost metaphysical.
Before Webster, Cagle, and McClure a careful analysis of intent
62. Id.
63. Id. at 796, 581 S.W.2d at 552.
64. Id. at 795, 581 S.W.2d at 551-52.
65. 228 Ark. 150, 306 S.W.2d 104 (1957).
66. 238 Ark. 561, 383 S.W.2d 99 (1964), also discussed at footnote 15.
67. 265 Ark. 792, 796-97, 581 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1979).
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would have relied on Garvin v. Linton,5 confirmed and quoted as
recently as 1973 in Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equipment
Corp.19 Both of these latter cases are cited in McClure."° The
Davidson case reviews a few other aspects of the law of intent and
deserves some attention. A quote sets the stage:
We agree with appellant that one cannot purge a usurious contract
by a retroactive correction or a subsequent disclaimer. We also
agree that the validity of a contract attacked for usury does not
turn upon the question of whether the alleged usurer has a specific
intent to violate the usury laws. The intent required is an intent
to receive or reserve a rate of interest that proves to be usurious.
Still, we have long recognized that an honest error of calculation
will not render a contract usurious.7 1
The Davidson court upheld a chancellor's finding of no usury, even
though the lender received under the contract an extra three or four
dollars on a $20,000 loan, because the overcharge had been made by
error.
7 1
Even before Webster and Cagle, all mistakes did not suffice to
excuse usury. If the mistake were one of law, and not one of fact,
there could be no avoidance of usury. 3 This rule did not appear to
hold when the lender's mistake of law was induced by fraud on the
part of the borrower .7
It is important to note that, under earlier cases, the intent
required was not necessarily the intent to violate the law, but rather
the intent to take an amount of money as interest or for the forbear-
ance of collecting a debt which, if calculated properly, amounted to
more than ten percent per annum. A clear judicial statement of this
distinction appears in Perry v. Shelby: 5 "While it is not necessary
that both parties be cognizant of the fact or facts constituting usury,
it is necessary that the lender have an intention to charge a usurious
68. 62 Ark. 370, 35 S.W. 430 (1896).
69. 255 Ark. 127, 499 S.W.2d 68 (1973).
70. First American Nat'l Bank of Nashville, Tenn. v. McClure Const. Co., 265 Ark. 792,
795, 581 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1979).
71. 255 Ark. 127, 129, 499 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1973).
72. Id. at 132, 499 S.W.2d at 71.
73. First Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 249 Ark. 972, 977, 463 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1971) (citing
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Catalani, 238 Ark. 561, 383 S.W.2d 99 (1964); Holland v. C. T. Doan
Buick Co., 228 Ark. 340, 307 S.W.2d 538 (1957); Brooks v. Burgess, 228 Ark. 150, 306 S.W.2d
104 (1957)).
74. Turney v. Roberts, 255 Ark. 503, 501 S.W.2d 601 (1973); Perry v. Shelby, 196 Ark.
541, 118 S.W.2d 849 (1938).
75. 196 Ark. 541, 118 S.W.2d 849 (1938).
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rate of interest or be cognizant of the fact or facts which constitute
usury."7"
In ferreting out intent, previous cases appear to rely heavily on
the following:
(1) the level of sophistication of the parties involved;"
(2) the obviousness of overcharges, as in Wilson v.
Whitworth,5 in which the court, commenting on an effective sev-
enty percent rate of interest disguised as a charge for insurance,
quoted Lord Mansfield: "[Ilt is impossible to wink so hard as not
to see;" 79
(3) the care with which documents are drawn. Blank con-
tracts are very dangerous for lenders to use.80 It is equally dangerous
for a lender to fail to explain the purpose of extra charges .8 This rule
is so strong that it stands as a minor exception to the general rule
that "[Ulsury will not be presumed, imputed or inferred where an
opposite result can be reached."8 2 The exception provides that any
such unexplained extra charges will be presumed to be interest until
proved to be something else;
(4) the involvement of the borrower in creating the deal and
the voluntariness of his actions;83
(5) the credibility of the witnesses, especially with respect to
whether the lender tried to comply with the law; 4
(6) the weight and clarity of evidence;85 and
(7) the general circumstances of the loan."'
76. Id. at 546, 118 S.W.2d at 851 (emphasis added).
77. Turney v. Roberts, 255 Ark. 503, 501 S.W.2d 601 (1973); Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark.
164, 458 S.W.2d 403 (1970); Perry v. Shelby, 196 Ark. 541, 118 S.W.2d 849 (1938).
78. 197 Ark. 675, 125 S.W.2d 112 (1939).
79. Id. at 679, 125 S.W.2d at 114.
80. Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Hudgens, 234 Ark. 1127, 356 S.W.2d 658 (1962); Clem v.
Nelson, 230 Ark. 296, 322 S.W.2d 448 (1959); Thompson v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 223
Ark. 483, 267 S.W.2d 11 (1954).
81. United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Teague, 245 Ark. 132, 432 S.W.2d 1 (1968).
82. Hayes v. First National Bank of Memphis, 256 Ark. 328, 331, 507 S.W.2d 701, 703
(1974).
83. Turney v. Roberts, 255 Ark. 503, 501 S.W.2d 601 (1973); Green v. Mid-State Homes,
Inc., 245 Ark. 866, 435 S.W.2d 436 (1968); Perry v. Shelby, 196 Ark. 541, 118 S.W.2d 849
(1938).
84. Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 256 Ark. 804, 510 S.W.2d 571 (1974);
Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 499 S.W.2d 68 (1973); Redbarn
Chemicals, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973).
85. Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 499 S.W.2d 68 (1973).
See also Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 256 Ark. 804, 808, 510 S.W.2d 571, 574
(1974), where the court noted that "[w]hen the questioned instrument is not usurious on its
face, this intent must be clearly shown;" and Sosebee v. Boswell, 242 Ark. 396, 402-12, 414
S.W.2d 380, 384-89 (1967) (Harris, C.J. and Fogleman, J., dissenting).
86. Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 256 Ark. 804, 510 S.W.2d 571 (1974);
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We can hope that Webster, Cagle, and McClure do not render
this analysis meaningless, but we must admit that they cause us
concern. The court will have to revert to careful rather than clever
language before we can be sure.
RULE 14 (CREDIT INSURANCE)
Poole v. Bates87 confirms Rule 14, as perceived, explicitly.
Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc.,s confirms the rule but with cau-
tionary teachings. In Poole the lender was also the insurance agent.
The lender, as agent, received the premium payment for a credit life
insurance policy. He paid sixty-five percent of that premium to the
insurance carrier, but he either kept or received back thirty-five
percent of it as his commission. Since the entire cost of the premium
was included in the loan, borrower contended that the interest (here
ten percent) on the thirty-five percent of the premium retained by
the lender was interest on money which never left the lender's con-
trol and, when added to ten percent on the rest of the money, ren-
dered the contract usurious. The Arkansas Supreme Court disa-
greed for three reasons: First, the borrower requested the insurance;
Second, the insurance transaction was bona fide, in that the charge
for the insurance was not excessive and the benefit that the borrower
desired to purchase was received (echoes of Key v. Worthen Bank);
and Last, there was "no element of fraud, nor duress or compul-
sion." 9 "In other words," said the court, "no unlawful charge or
profit is involved." 90 The interest on lawful profit was lawful.
In Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc.,9 1 the Arkansas Supreme
Court overturned a summary judgment in favor of an installment
seller who had also sold credit life insurance to a buyer. The buyer
had voluntarily elected to buy the insurance from the seller. The
seller received the same thirty-five percent premium commission
approved in Poole. In Robinson, however, the buyer alleged in an
affidavit that he could have purchased the insurance for less from
any one of eight other insurance companies, and that the seller knew
of this fact and failed to tell the buyer. The buyer further alleged
that the insurance he bought from the seller was more expensive,
Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark. 164, 458 S.W.2d 403 (1970); Textron, Inc. v. Whitener, 249 Ark. 57,
458 S.W.2d 367 (1970); Nineteen Corp. v. Guaranty Financial Corp., 246 Ark. 400,438 S.W.2d
685 (1969).
87. 257 Ark. 764, 520 S.W.2d 273 (1975).
88. 258 Ark. 935, 530 S.W.2d 660 (1975).
89. Poole v. Bates, 257 Ark. 764, 767, 520 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1975).
90. Id.
91. 258 Ark. 935, 530 S.W.2d 660 (1975).
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by about the value of the seller's thirty-five percent commission,
than the insurance he could and would have bought had he known
of it. The court said this raised a triable issue of whether "the
collateral transaction was a cloak for usury" and cited an Arkansas
statute requiring life insurance salesmen to exercise discretion and
good faith.92
In view of the earlier decision in Poole, the theory seemed to be
that the difference between the reasonable cost of the insurance and
the seller's inflated cost was interest, not that the commission itself
was necessarily interest. The decision in Robinson, however, con-
tains the opposite inference." Essentially identical fact situations in
Poole and Robinson, even down to the borrower's requesting the
insurance, were distinguished by the lender's intent and good faith;
by the relationship of extraneous facts to the facts of the case; and
by differing approaches to commissions which are difficult to recon-
cile objectively.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. N. B. Yarbrough,4 requires that the
earlier case of Foster v. Universal C.L T. Corp.,9" cited in Usury in
Arkansas, be re-examined and greater significance attached to its
teachings. The "seeds of usury" doctrine set forth in Foster has been
applied primarily in credit insurance cases." In both Foster and
Yarbrough the lenders sold insurance as part of a single transaction,
to insure that all money was advanced at a single time under a
single contract. The financing contracts, under which both auto
sales and purchases of insurance were financed, provided that any
refund of insurance premiums would be applied to the last-
maturing installment. When the refunds occurred, according to the
court, they should have been applied to the then-outstanding prin-
cipal, with interest adjusted accordingly. To hold the refunds until
the final payment, while charging interest on the full amount origi-
nally disbursed, resulted in actual interest exceeding ten percent.
The refund of the insurance premium, oddly enough, caused the
seeds of usury to ripen into illegality.
If Foster did not, Yarbrough should finally end the practice of
financing a sale and an insurance premium together, unless the
insurance premium is irrevocably paid to a third party without
chance of refund into the dealer's hands. Apparently it would be
92. Id. at 939, 530 S.W.2d at 662 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3029 (Supp. 1973)).
93. Id. at 938, 530 S.W.2d at 662.
94. 263 Ark. 610, 567 S.W.2d 96 (1978).
95. 231 Ark. 230, 330 S.W.2d 288 (1959).
96. A contract contains the "seeds of usury" when, by its terms, it includes a contin-
gency the happening of which will render the contract usurious.
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safer to handle the sale and the insurance policy at separate desks
with separate financing contracts. The customer could be told that
the sale would be completed upon his purchase of insurance either
at the second desk or any other place of his choosing. The risk of
usury is far greater than the risk that many customers would either
walk out or buy their insurance elsewhere.
ADDED RULE 16 (DISBURSEMENT)
This rule rests on two old cases, Matthews v. Georgia State
Savings Association' and McDougall v. Hachmeister."8 In
Matthews the borrower executed a bond and mortgage on May 21,
1915, with the bond calling for interest from that day. The borrower,
however, did not receive his funds from the lender until June 9,
1915. The Arkansas Supreme Court found the transaction free of
usury, citing, among other reasons, the following:
[T]he circumstances of the loan show good faith on the part of
the association. It is evident that the delay was unavoidably inci-
dent to the completion of the transaction and that there was no
intent on the part of the association to charge usurious rate of
interest.[sic] This is shown by the circumstances attending the
consummation of the loan.9
The Matthews court also found that, by calculating the pay-
ments a certain way, the lender could in effect avoid charging more.
than ten percent interest.' This reasoning is not persuasive because
the instrument sued upon specified the method of calculation, stat-
ing how much of each payment was to be apportioned to interest.
Under the terms of the instrument itself more than ten percent was
collected.
McDougall v. Hachmeister'°l contained no finding that the in-
terest could have been calculated to reduce it below ten percent. In
McDougall the court clearly allowed interest to be charged from
May 23, 1921, even though a major portion of the money was not
disbursed until July 1, 1921, (a small portion had been disbursed
earlier on June 3, 1921). The court dismissed this problem, citing
Matthews as follows:
(1) There was a delay in paying the money to appellants after the
execution of the instruments, but it was caused by a defect in the
97. 132 Ark. 219, 200 S.W. 130 (1918).
98. 184 Ark. 28, 41 S.W.2d 1088 (1931).
99. Matthews v. Georgia State Say. Ass'n, 132 Ark. 219, 226, 200 S.W. 130, 132 (1918).
100. Id. at 227, 200 S.W. at 132.
101. 184 Ark. 28, 41 S.W.2d 1088 (1931).
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abstract of title to the land, which appellants agreed to furnish.
The delay after the defects were corrected was not unreasonable,
but, on the contrary, the transaction was wound up expeditiously.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the delay was a
subterfuge resorted to in order to obtain more than 10 per cent per
annum for the use of the money. This court said in the case of
Matthews v. Georgia State Building & Loan Assn., 132 Ark. 220,
200 S.W. 130, 21 A.L.R. 789, that "a contract is not usurious when
the parties acted in good faith, where 10 per cent interest is
charged, where the agreement was dated May 21, 1915, but was not
closed and the money delivered until June 9, 1915." As the delay
was not occasioned by the fault or bad faith on the part of appel-
lees, the principal must be regarded as received by appellants on
the date of the contract in determining whether same is usurious.'0
The Matthews-McDougall rule is Arkansas law.
It is interesting to note that if a loan has not been entirely
disbursed, this does not necessarily create usury problems for lend-
ers charging ten percent. Additionally, when a loan has been fully
disbursed, this does assist lenders trying to fend off usury allega-
tions based on collateral agreements.'03
Reliance on these two cases requires careful analysis. Matthews
was partially overruled on other grounds by the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Winston v. Personal Finance Company.°4 Later, however,
the court clearly implied that both Matthews and McDougall re-
main good law by distinguishing them in First National Bank v.
Thompson. 05 McDougall has been cited often in later cases.
The recent case of McCoy Farms, Inc. v. J & M McKee, 0 may
also support this rule, although the case mentioned neither
Matthews nor McDougall. McCoy Farms may not be a usury case
at all, but rather a procedural case explaining the meaning of spe-
cific performance and the effect of settlements. In McCoy Farms,
as a result of a trial settlement, a note dated February 1, 1976, was
executed August 30, 1976. The note was due February 1, 1977, at
eight and one-half percent interest. If the interest due on February
1, 1977, had been collected on money outstanding only since August
30, 1977, the return would have been usurious. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court found that the circumstances of settlement showed
102. Id. at 32, 41 S.W.2d at 1090.
103. See discussion with reference to Rule 7 (Computational Devices: Discounting,
Points, Allocating Payments), p. 326-27 supra.
104. 220 Ark. 580, 249 S.W.2d 315 (1952).
105. 249 Ark. 972, 463 S.W.2d 87 (1971).
106. 263 Ark. 20, 563 S.W.2d 409 (1978).
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clearly that the note should be construed to have been outstanding
since February 1, 1976. The facts are highly unusual, but the senti-
ments, based primarily on cases from other jurisdictions, conform
entirely to the rule of Matthews and McDougall.
ADDED RULE 17 (UNCERTAIN RATES)
Foster v. Universal C.L T. Corp., 0 , discussed with reference to
Rule 14 in this article, held the. seeds of Added Rule 17. The doctrine
did not fructify, however, until 1978 with the decision in Ryder
Truck Rental v. Kramer.'0 In Kramer, the contract set a variable
rate, one and three-quarters percent above Boston prime.' °9 At the
time of the contract's execution, the effective rate was well below
ten percent. In a few months the Boston prime rate rocketed to more
than ten percent and the obligation became usurious in Arkansas.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for de-
fendant borrower. The court disregarded (over disclaimers to the
contrary) intent of the parties and brushed aside a sophisticated
theory calling for an analysis of return only over the entire life of
the loan. The overall return on the loan could have been lower than
ten percent if Boston prime had decreased before the final due date
of the loan but after the filing of the complaint. If the variable rate
contract had called for interest at one and three-quarters percent
above Boston prime but not more than ten percent per annum in
any given month or over the life of the loan, it apparently would
have worked. The decision in Kramer requires both a life-of-the-
loan and a periodic ceiling to avoid usury. In that way, Kramer is
consistent with Redbarn Chemicals, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 1"0 in which a
single month's excessive interest rendered void a continuing con-
tractual relationship.
Both Kramer and Redbarn Chemicals, Inc. elicited extensive
dissenting opinions. The dissents demonstrate that the Arkansas
Supreme Court is not immune to the emotional divisiveness the
usury question tends to cause generally in Arkansas, but they do not
give lenders much on which to rely. Despite such dissents the law
has been relatively consistent since 1952. If the terms of the contract
agreed to by the parties call for a usurious rate of interest, or if the
107. 231 Ark. 230, 330 S.W.2d 288 (1959).
108. 263 Ark. 169, 563 S.W.2d 451 (1978).
109. Id. at 172, 563 S.W.2d at 453. "Boston prime" means that rate which the major
banks in Boston are charging on loans to their best customers, which rate rises and falls at
irregular intervals.
110. 254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973).
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lender willingly receives what proves to be in fact a usurious rate,
the contract will be voided. In deciding whether either has hap-
pened, the court will be conservative and will be intentionally blind
to the economic impact of the law on the state's economy and on
the parties litigant. As much and as strenuously as the authors of
this article disagree with the policy of the law, they cannot and do
not disagree with the Arkansas Supreme Court majority's decision
to apply the law as it reads, so long as the law reads as it does.
Procedural matters
Most procedural matters relative to usury cases remain un-
changed over the last seven years."' The burden of proof, namely
the burden of going forward with the evidence in the first instance,
rests with the party alleging usury."' Proof of usury must be clear
and convincing. A mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffi-
cient because the intention to charge a usurious rate of interest will
never be presumed, imputed, or inferred where an opposite result
can be reached."' This rule, however, does not help a careless lender
who leaves loan documents blank. The borrower and the court may
presume that unidentified extra charges are really interest."4 In
matters of interpretation, a court will consider all attendant circum-
stances to determine the meaning of an allegedly usurious con-
tract.1"5
Drafting errors which make a contract usurious on its face when
it is not usurious in fact do not amount to usury. In Parks v. E.N.
Beard Hardwood Lumber, Inc.,"' the seller under an open account
calling for an annual interest of twelve percent, over a period of
time, consistently billed and collected less than ten percent annual
interest. The court found no usury, agreeing with the trial court that
the interest charged as a matter of practice and not the interest
called for was the critical focus under the usury law. This case,
however, adds to the questions analyzed under the restatement of
Rule 12."11
111. Usury in Ark., supra note 1, at 265 nn.6(1) and 6(2), 266 nn.6(3 )-6(11).
112. Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 Ark. 725, 543 S.W.2d 496 (1976);
Poole v. Bates, 257 Ark. 764, 520 S.W.2d 273 (1975); Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n,
256 Ark. 804, 510 S.W.2d 571 (1974); Hayes v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 256 Ark. 328,
507 S.W.2d 701 (1974).
113. Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 256 Ark. 804, 510 S.W.2d 571 (1974).
114. Usury in Ark., supra note 1 at 265, n.6(2).
115. Brown v. Central Ark. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 256 Ark. 804, 510 S.W.2d 571 (1974);
Redbarn Chemicals, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973).
116. 263 Ark. 501, 565 S.W.2d 615 (1978).
117. See discussion of Rule 12 supra at 337.
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In usury cases, the Arkansas courts will admit parol evidence.
Usury in Arkansas indicated that this rule extended -only to parol
evidence tending to show usury."'8 A careful analysis of the dictum
in Textron, Inc. v. Whitener, 9 shows that such evidence is admissi-
ble for broader purposes. The trial court in Textron had admitted
parol evidence to show that a contract usurious on its face was not
actually a violation of the usury law. Although the courts, both trial
and appellate, found usury in Textron, the Arkansas Supreme Court
said of the parol evidence question: "We cannot say that the trial
court ignored that [parol] evidence simply because he ultimately
found in his memorandum opinion that the promissory note sued
upon was usurious."' 20 Appellant alleged that the trial court had
erred in failing to admit parol evidence. The Arkansas Supreme
Court found that such parol evidence had been admitted and there-
fore refused to reverse on the alleged error.
IV. NEW AREAS
A. Are Leases Loans?
Usury in Arkansas suggested leases might be loans, not because
of any usury cases, but because of Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp., ' 2 1 a warranty case holding an abandonment lease "analogous
to a sale."' ' In Sawyer the Arkansas Supreme Court's warning is
clear:
[Aigreements of this nature will be examined closely by this
court. It is possible that similar agreements could be used to cloak
usurious charges, i.e., a transaction which was actually a sale could
be set up as a lease in order to enable charges to be made that
would, under a credit sale, constitute usury.' 23
The original article suggested that no careful leasing company
should risk operating in Arkansas with abandonment leases calling
for more than a ten percent return. Itek Leasing Corporation, appar-
ently of Rochester, New York, neither heeded the warning nor took
that advice. It should have. In Bell v. Itek Leasing Corp., 24 the
Arkansas Supreme Court overturned the trial court's ruling that a
118. Usury in Ark., supra note 1, at 266.
119. 249 Ark. 57, 458 S.W.2d 367 (1970).
120. Id. at 59, 458 S.W.2d at 368. See also Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation,
Inc., 264 Ark. 851, 576 S.W.2d 181 (1979).
121. 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
122. Id. at 954, 428 S.W.2d at 52; supra note 2 at 307-08.
123. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 958, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968).
124. 262 Ark. 22, 555 S.W.2d 1 (1977).
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lease was not a credit sale. The court found the lease to be a sale
due to "five important points:' 1 25 (1) Defendant was a finance com-
pany, not a manufacturer of the leased equipment; (2) All risk of
loss was on lessee; (3) Default provisions made the lease like a
conditional sale; (4) The lease called for a UCC financing state-
ment, and one was signed; and (5) The lease called for purchase
upon termination of the lease at ten percent of the original contract
price.
The case leaves many questions unanswered. Would a change
in one, two, or more of the above provisions make any difference?
Can the presence of any one of the provisions render a lease a loan?
A simple majority? Are some of the factors more important than
others? We don't know. Given the history of litigants' imagination
under Arkansas' usury law and the occasional carelessness of lend-
ers in this area, we probably will find out over the next few years.
The only prudent course in any lease with an option-to-buy arrange-
ment, either explicit or implicit,"6 is to insure that the overall return
to the lessor does not exceed the stated original cash price plus ten
percent per annum on the outstanding balance of the total unpaid
purchase price. The court, however, gave no real guidance to the
lessor in making such calculations.
B. Federal Diversions.
When state law doesn't work, or when it works too well, lawyers
routinely try to find a federal solution. With Arkansas usury law,
four distinct federal diversions must be noted.
i. National Banks
National banks have been subject, from time to time, to the
state imposed ceiling on interest rates, but never to the state penal-
ties. This anomalous situation grows from title 12, sections 85 and
86 of the United States Code. Section 85 provides an interest ceiling
equivalent to the state ceiling or one percent higher than the federal
discount rate,'" or, for business and agricultural loans in excess of
$25,000.00, five percent above the federal discount rate, whichever
is higher. Section 86 then prescribes the penalty for violation of
section 85. The penalty is generally loss of interest only.
125. Id. at 24-26, 555 S.W.2d at 2-3.
126. Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 264 Ark. 851, 854-55, 576
S.W.2d 181, 183-84 (1979).
127. See note 9, supra.
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National banks in Arkansas, relying on title 12, section 86 of the
United States Code and faced with the staggeringly high discount
rates of 1978 and 1979, have charged rates in excess of ten percent,
generally ten and one-half percent. To a degree, this has amelio-
rated the economic effects of Arkansas' usury law.
ii. The "Brock Bill" and its Arkansas step-child
For a brief time, the usury limit for FDIC-insured state banks
also exceeded ten percent. The "Brock Bill"' 8 allowed such institu-
tions to charge five percent above the federal discount rate. The law
was in effect from October 29, 1974, until it expired on July 1, 1977.
It was considered a temporary emergency measure and applied in
practice to only three states. For business or agricultural loans in
excess of $25,000.00 processed during this period, the law's effect
was monumental, allowing loans to be made at thirteen percent.
During the life of the Brock Bill, Senator Brock's home state of
Tennessee took steps to remove its own restrictive usury law limits
by referendum. This happened against the backdrop of an Arkansas
referendum in 1974 in which the Arkansas usury law was specifically
retained. Under these circumstances, Congress was slow to bail out
Arkansas lenders again.
The Brock Bill was ruled to be constitutional in concept, before
its passage, by Arkansas' Attorney General.'"2 As noted in Section
I, it was held constitutional in fact in Stephens Security Bank v.
Eppivic Corp. 1 30 Because of its close parallel with title 12, sections
85 and 86 of the United States Code, and the legislative intent to
provide more equal treatment for state and national institutions, it
is clear that the Brock Bill preempted both the state ceiling and the
state penalty for usury.' 3'
A close approximation of the Brock Bill was introduced in Con-
gress by the Arkansas delegation (with apparent mixed feelings) in
early 1979.131 It provided for expiration on January 1, 1981-two
months after the vote on the Constitution of 1980 in Arkansas, ap-
parently the last state where such congressional intervention makes
any difference.
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
129. Opinion 74-94, Arkansas Attorney General, July 22, 1974.
130. 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
131. First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 1975).




FHA and VA loans raise other questions, not all of which can
be answered. The federal government sets the permissible maxi-
mum interest rate a lender may charge on such loans. It further sets
the permissible maximum discount, and it collects a fee for the
insurance of the loans, computed as a percentage of the outstanding
balance.
The Stephens Security Bank'33 and Nowlin134 cases may be
applicable to this analysis, except that the Brock Bill specifically
purported to pre-empt state law, while the applicable federal legis-
lation, particularly in the case of FHA loans, does not."5 If there is
no federal preemption, is mortgage insurance (public or private)
interest? The question is more than academic if the stated rate is
nine and three-quarters percent and the insurance premium is one-
half of one percent. Essentially, mortgage insurance is a fee for a
guaranty, paid to a third party, which was held not to constitute
interest in Leonhard v. Flood. 3 The following language in Lockhart
v. G.M.A. C., '3 which dealt with the purchase of single interest auto-
mobile casualty insurance upon debtor's failure to maintain insur-
ance, may also be helpful:
Not every charge made to the borrower which benefits the lender
will render a transaction usurious simply because the interest rate
is a full 10%, particularly if the charge is reasonable, is made in
good faith and is reimbursement for a payment to a third person
for something appropriate in establishing or protecting of the
lender's security. For instance, we have recognized the propriety
of such charges as property inspection fees, expense of an abstract
of title, title examination fees, insurance premiums paid a third
party, recording fees, expense of obtaining a release of a prior lien,
and title insurance premiums. 131
Our neighboring state of Tennessee as early as 1960 determined
that such charges were not interest, but were instead "an expense
incident to the necessity of furnishing the lender satisfactory secu-
133. Stephens Sec. Bank v. Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
134. First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
135. 12 U.S.C. §1701(1).
136. 68 Ark. 162, 165, 56 S.W. 781, 782 (1900).
137. 252 Ark. 878, 880, 481 S.W.2d 350, 351 (1972).
138. Id. at 880, 481 S.W.2d at 351; Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark. 164, 458 S.W.2d 403 (1970);
United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Teague, 245 Ark. 132, 432 S.W.2d 1 (1968); Harris v. Guaranty
Financial Corp., 244 Ark. 218, 424 S.W.2d 355 (1968); Winston v. Personal Finance Co. of
Pine Bluff, 220 Ark. 580, 249 S.W.2d 315 (1952).
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rity for the repayment of the money loaned for that purpose." '1
We believe the Arkansas Supreme Court will follow the ration-
ale of Leonhard, Lockhart and the Tennessee Supreme Court and
will consider these premiums in the category of other third party
payments and, therefore, not interest. The court, however, does not
often consider the usury law of other states in reaching its decisions
and has a way of finding usury in unusual places. We do not, there-
fore, set forth our belief as the law.
iv. Is our constitution unconstitutional?
A totally new kind of federal question emerged in November,
1978, in Quinn-Moore v. Adams, 40 in which the state's right to set
interest ceilings was challenged under the United States Constitu-
tion. Taking their cue from a California state court case decided at
the trial level earlier in 1978,'" and currently on appeal, the Quinn-
Moore plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment voiding the ten per-
cent constitutional limit as a burden on interstate commerce.'42 Also
invoked were the Supremacy Clause,4 3 and the Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The case has attracted as intervenors on both
sides of the issue lenders and consumer groups and apparently pre-
supposes an appeal to the United States Supreme Court whatever
the Arkansas Supreme Court holds.'"
VI. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL
The developments in the Arkansas Supreme Court's expressed
attitudes toward usury and usurers, as opposed to the developments
in the money market, in the preceding seven years have been pre-
dictable and unexceptional. The virtual demise of any meaningful
requirement that there be a bilateral agreement to pay and collect
excessive interest may be conceptually troublesome. The Cagle and
Webster cases, however, are at least consistent in spirit with the
court's prior decisions.
We really didn't need Bell v. Itek Leasing to tell us that loans
139. Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361, 368, 333 S.W.2d 810,
813 (1960).
140. No. 78-6045 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Nov. 1978).
141. Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v. State of California, No. C-158-
433 (Los Angeles Co. Sup. 1978).
142. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8(3).
143. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
144. The case is scheduled to be tried in the fall of 1979.
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disguised as leases would not pass muster. If Mack Trucks seems
over-broad in its condemnation of certain rather common and eco-
nomically justifiable lending practices, no one can say that the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court ever hinted that those practices were accept-
able. The court has always insisted that it would not take economics
into consideration and that the Arkansas Constitution means ex-
actly what it says. The case law of the last seven years merely serves
to confirm those past declarations.
As we have indicated before, the effects of the constitutional
provision have not really changed either. Like the court's opinions,
these effects simply have become more clearly delineated. Con-
sumer goods continue to cost more in Arkansas because the cash
customer is forced to help pay for the cost of credit. 4 ' Loans which,
because of the risk involved, call for a high rate of return, simply
aren't made."' Money which can earn a higher return elsewhere goes
there, instead of into the Arkansas housing market or into expansion
of Arkansas businesses.147 Because interest rates on savings are
largely controlled by the "spread" between those rates and the rates
charged on loans by the same institution, even Arkansas savers are
penalized by the limitation. Finally, the provision has recently cre-
ated a disparity between the rates chargeable by national banks and
by state banks on most loans.
In return for these negative effects, Arkansas borrowers are pro-
vided with loan funds, if they can get them, at lower rates than
borrowers in surrounding states. Arkansas borrowers also do not
have to worry about figuring the rate allowed on a given loan-that
has become increasingly clear.
But shouldn't there be some limit to protect borrowers who
need it, and some way, constitutional or otherwise, to keep interest
rates within reasonable limits? Although we might be inclined to
choose "otherwise," we believe any realistic proposal for reform
must at least begin with the Arkansas Constitution, and include
specific protections set forth therein, to be acceptable to the Arkan-
sas electorate. Any such proposal must also be reasonably brief and
easy to understand. And it must assure meaningful protection.
With these requirements in mind, as well as certain similar
proposals under consideration by the Constitutional Convention as
of this writing, we propose the following amended article:






Section 1. All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten
percent per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and
the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law, except as
otherwise iirovided herein;
Section 2. All contracts which state no rate of interest shall be
at six percent per annum;
Section 3. Except as the General Assembly may otherwise pro-
vide, the defense of usury shall not be available to a corporation
or to a limited partnership;
Section 4. The General Assembly may provide by law that con-
tracts for loans of money by financial institutions licensed as lend-
ers by the State of Arkansas; that loans of money by financial
institutions the deposits of which are insured by an agency of the
United States government; and that loans of money the repayment
of which is guaranteed or insured in whole or in part by an agency
of the United States government may bear interest at a rate not
exceeding that allowed by the appropriate laws and regulations of
the United States with respect to such loans or contracts or, in the
absence of such laws and regulations, at a rate established by the
General Assembly.
Section 5. The General Assembly may provide by law what
charges shall and what charges shall not be considered as interest
within the meaning of this article.
By tracking current constitutional language, we preserve the
value of case law and policy built up under the 1874 Constitution.
Essentially, Section 3 eliminates many business loans from the
prohibition, while retaining it as to sole proprietors, normal partner-
ships and unincorporated farmers. Sophisticated investors often use
limited partnerships. Corporations also imply the idea of some fin-
ancial sophistication. The underlying theory here conforms to that
developed by the Arkansas Supreme Court in the area of fraud and
intent. We will protect the less sophisticated borrower, but we will
allow those who know what they are doing to take risks they deem
reasonable.
Section 4 allows banks, savings and loans and FHA-VA lenders
to follow the national money market. Mortgage bankers are licensed
and regulated by the State, hence, the General Assembly would set
the maximum rate for their non-FHA-VA loans. Licensed lenders
are not loan sharks. The state can deal with them without resorting
to a usury bludgeon. Under Section 5, the General Assembly could
also make policy decisions about genuine commitment fees, dis-
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counts, and consumer credit costs. 4 '
The severe penalty for charging excessive interest remains the
same. By leaving the penalty, we show we still mean business. The
proposal also makes what the authors consider a reasonable compro-
mise between seeking to inject a comprehensive, statute-like
scheme into the constitution and giving the General Assembly un-
trammeled discretion in the area. Decisions of the last seven years
evidence no inclination on the part of the Arkansas Supreme Court
to compromise on the constitutional limit. The protection is there,
even if it hurts more than it helps.
A few conceptual loose-ends regarding usury remain unat-
tended to. The Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to deal with a
genuine commitment fee or an actuarily defensible discount, Mack
Trucks notwithstanding. Some questions on leasing remain unan-
swered. And the role of intent in the law has lost rather than gained
clarity in recent decisions. But it is difficult to conceive of decisions
in these areas which would represent a significant departure from
the pattern already established by the Arkansas Supreme Court, or
which would have any substantial effect on Arkansas' economy. Any
significant changes in the law of usury in Arkansas can only come
from the Constitutional Convention and the electorate.
148. The basic text of this article was already on its way to the printer when the
Arkansas Constitutional Convention completed its proposed draft of the new constitution.
Unless altered when the Convention reconvenes briefly in 1980, apparently the draft will give
the electorate a separate vote on the usury article, choosing between the present article and
a new article essentially tying the Arkansas rate to the federal discount rate.
This method is, to some extent, like the constitutional mechanism for setting salaries of
constitutional officers-the idea apparently was to set the rate as high as it could reasonably
be expected to go, and high enough so that one could quit worrying about discounts, points,
commitment fees, etc.
This approach plainly begs the question and, further, pegs the rate to a standard which
may be re-defined or even eliminated entirely by Congress-the discount rate on 90-day
commercial paper in our federal reserve district.
While the Convention's proposal (if adopted) would in fact offer some relief, we would
strongly urge the Convention to reconsider its work to see if it has not placed too high a value
on absolute simplicity. While not advancing our own proposal as a panacea, we believe the
voters could in fact make an intelligent decision on a proposed article which specifically
addressed such problems as (a) differentiating between different types of borrowers; (b)
uncertainty as to the meaning or effect of discounts, commitment fees and mortgage insur-
ance; and (c) allowing regulated lenders to operate within the framework of their own place
in the governmental and economic scheme, rather than in accordance with an arbitrary
standard.
We also believe such an approach would be good politics, as it would tend to banish the
spectre of an across-the-board increase in interest rates to the highest level permitted by
the article for all loans. Winning voter approval for a new usury article is not going to be
easy, and we simply suggest that the Convention consider whether a finer tuned article
might be easier to sell in fact, as well as more functional in operation.
